We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List's (2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that the recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
Introduction
Is giving equivalent to not taking? Consider a dictator with a $10 endowment who can take some, all or none from the recipient's $5 endowment. If the dictator takes $3, we cannot say that the dictator is selfish. A selfish dictator would maximize her own final payoff by taking $5 and leaving the recipient with nothing. By not taking $2 the dictator has reduced her payoff from $15 to $13 and increased the recipient's payoff from $0 to $2. But can we say that by not taking $2 the dictator feels the same as if she gave $2. In other words, is not taking the same as giving?
To answer this question we examine behavior in a parallel game in which the dictator can achieve the same final payoffs by giving instead of not taking. Consider a standard dictator game in which the dictator receives a $15 endowment, the recipient receives $0, and the dictator may give some, all or none of her endowment to the recipient. If the dictator gives $2 in this game, the payoffs achieved, $13 and $2, are identical to those observed above when the dictator did not take $2. In these two games, if the dictator feels the same about not taking as about giving, the final payoffs should be the same.
Finding that not taking is equivalent to giving would provide an alternative explanation to results observed in taking games reported by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) .
1 Both Bardsley and List compare the results of a standard dictator game with the results of a dictator game in which the payoff possibilities are extended by allowing the dictator to take some of the recipient's endowment. Both Bardsley and List find that the payoffs to the recipients tend to decrease when the taking option is available. Bardsley states that "The reversing of generosity between treatments is inconsistent with any … orthodox social preference account" and "One explanation of the present results is that dictator game giving is … an artifact of behavioural experimentation" (Bardsley 2008, p. 128) . List concludes that "the data suggest that current interpretations of dictator game data likely need revision. Rather than representing social preferences as currently modeled in the oft-cited literature, the data are consistent with the power of changing the giver and recipient expectations" (2007, p. 490) .
In this paper, we begin by showing that Bardsley's and List's findings are consistent with impure altruism if giving is equivalent to not taking. Korenok et al. (2013) show that the impurely altruistic utility function rationalizes giving in the presence of reallocation of 1 Also, see Cappelen et al. (2013) for field evidence.
endowments. Therefore, if not taking is equivalent to giving, the impurely altruistic utility also rationalizes Bardsley and List's results.
We then report the results of an experiment in which the dictator makes decisions in nine scenarios with different taking options and constant payoff possibilities. We compare the outcomes in the nine decisions and find that the final payoffs are not the same; the recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases.
Therefore, we conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
Not Taking, Giving, and Impure Altruism
To show that the impurely altruistic utility function rationalizes List's results if not taking is equivalent to giving, we first describe List's experiments and illustrate how they violate "social preferences as currently modeled in the oft-cited literature" We then show how Bolton and Katok (1998) report similar violations in a different context. Next, we illustrate how impure altruism as introduced by Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 resolves the violations reported by Bolton and Katok. Finally, we describe how to modify impure altruism when not taking is equivalent to giving and illustrate how this modification resolves List's violations.
List's experiments extend the payoff possibilities available to the dictator by introducing the option to take. In List's baseline game the dictator's endowment is $10 and the dictator can give up to half of it to the recipient, whose endowment is $5. In List's Take 5 setting the dictator has the additional option of taking some or all of the recipient's endowment 2 . In both games, the sum of final payoffs must equal $15 and the maximum payoff to the recipient is $10. However, the minimum payoff to the recipient decreases from $5 in the baseline game to $0 in the Take 5 setting.
List finds that extending the set of payoff possibilities under the control of the dictator by adding the option to take significantly decreases the payoff to the recipient. 3 The recipient's average payoff decreases from $6.33 in the baseline game to $2.52 in the Take 5 setting and the decrease is not driven by dictators who give $0 in the baseline and take in the Take-5 setting. 2 We focus on List's comparison of the baseline and the Take 5 settings. List also compares the baseline with a Take 1 setting and Bardsley compares three different pairs of settings. In all cases, the final results are similar. 3 The payoff to the recipient also decreases as the option to take increases. The recipient's payoff tends to be lower in the Take 5 than in the Take 1 setting.
List notes that this reduction contradicts altruistic social preference theories. Such theories posit that utility is of the form ( , ),
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U π π where D π and R π are the payoffs to the dictator and recipient, respectively. To illustrate the contradiction, suppose that a dictator reduces the amount given from $2 in the baseline to $1 in the Take 5 setting. The final payoffs to the dictator and the recipient are ($8, $7) and ($9, $6), respectively. Choosing ($8, $7) when ($9, $6) is available in the baseline contradicts choosing ($9, $6) when ($8, $7) is available in the Take 5 treatment. Andeoni (1989, 1990) introduces the impurely altruistic utility function, ( , , )
by adding the amount given, G, as a third argument in the utility function to account for the warm glow derived from giving. 5 To illustrate how impure altruism resolves the contradiction noted by Bolton and Katok, suppose again that a dictator passes $2 in the 15-5 setting and $4 in the 18-2 setting. The final payoffs and the amount passed are ($13, $7, $2) and ($14, $6, $4), respectively. Choosing ($13, $7, $2) does not contradict choosing ($14, $6, $4) because the latter is not a feasible option in the 15-5 treatment. Similarly, the choice ($13, $7, $2) is not feasible in the 18-2 treatment (($13, $7, $5) is feasible). Korenok et al. (2013) show that the impurely altruistic utility function rationalizes the choices of dictators in giving games as the experimenter transfers endowments across subjects.
Impure altruism also resolves the contradictions observed by List and Bardsley if the amount given, G, and the amount not taken, N, are equivalent sources of warm glow. With this equivalence the dictator's utility function is ( , , ),
where S = G + N. 6 To illustrate that the modified impurely altruistic preferences resolve the contradictions, suppose again that a dictator passes $2 in List's baseline and passes $1 in the Take 5 setting. Since the dictator passes $1 in the Take 5 setting, she does not take $5, therefore S=$6. The final payoffs and the sum of passing and not taking are ($13, $7, $2) and ($14, $6, $6), respectively. Choosing ($13, $7, $2)
does not contradict choosing ($14, $6, $6) because the latter is not a feasible option in the baseline treatment. Similarly, the choice ($13, $7, $2) is not feasible in the Take 5 setting (($13, $7, $7) is feasible).
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Impure altruism cannot resolve all of the results that List reports. He also observes significantly less giving when the dictator earns the endowment instead of having the experimenter bestow it. Cherry et al. (2002) report a similar result while Luccasen and Grossman "find that warm glow giving persists when the endowment is earned" (2013, p, 16) . The standard theory of impure altruism does not address the effect of the source of the endowment and an exploration of it is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The equivalence of giving and not taking as a source of warm glow means that the experimenter can create isomorphically equivalent games by simultaneously transferring endowment from the recipient to the dictator while reducing by a similar magnitude the option to take. The payoffs and utility to the dictator are the same when S is constant in each of the three following settings.
1. The endowments to dictator and recipient are $15 and $0, respectively, and the dictator does not have the option to take.
2. The endowments to dictator and recipient are $10 and $5, respectively, and the dictator has the option to take up to $5 3. The endowments to dictator and recipient are $0 and $15, respectively, and the dictator has the option to take up to $15.
In all three settings the dictator's utility is U($13, $2, $2) when S = $2, for example. Notice that List's Take 5 game, captured in the second setting, is isomorphically equivalent to the non-taking game in the first setting.
To test whether giving is equivalent to not taking, we compare the final amount earned by the recipient in scenarios that are isomorphic in the ( , , )
space. Since the games are isomorphic, the optimal choices for the impurely altruistic dictator are identical if giving is equivalent to not taking. We use a within-subject design; subjects choose how much to give or to take in a menu of scenarios characterized by different endowments and maximum amounts that can be taken. We vary endowments as in Korenok et al. (2012) . We extend their design by also varying the amount of the recipient's endowment that the dictator may take. Table 1 describes the nine scenarios. In all scenarios the sum of final payoffs is $20. The minimum payoff to the recipient is $0 in five scenarios, $5 in three scenarios, and $10 in one scenario. The three scenarios depicted in Figure 1 allow four different types of comparisons. First, we compare observed behavior of subjects in Scenario 1 to the standard dictator games' results reported in the literature. Second, we compare behavior in Scenarios 1 and 2 to measure the impact on the recipient's final payoff of transferring endowment from the dictator to the recipient, as in Bolton and Katok (1998) . Third, we compare Scenarios 2 and 3 to measure the impact of adding the taking option, as in Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) . Finally, we compare Scenarios 1 and 3 to determine whether not taking is equivalent to giving as both scenarios are isomorphic in the ( , , )
The experiment was run in 5 sessions conducted in the Experimental Laboratory for Economics and Business Research at Virginia Commonwealth University. A total of 106 subjects recruited from introductory economics and business classes participated in the experiment. As in Andreoni and Miller's (2002) design, each subject was at the same time a dictator and a recipient. Korenok et al. (2013) show that having each subject play both roles does not have a significant impact on behavior as compared with a design in which each subject plays either dictator or recipient. Having each subject play both roles doubles the number of observations per session and reduces the boredom recipients face while waiting for dictators to make their choices.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated at computer terminals and given a set of instructions (included in the Appendix), which were later read aloud by the experimenter. The instructions concluded with a quiz designed to help the participants become familiar with the type of choices involved in the dictator game. The monitor checked the answers to the quiz to make sure that all subjects clearly understood the nature of the choices. Throughout the session, no communication between subjects was permitted and all information and choices were transmitted through computer terminals, using the software program z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
The computer presented to each subject the nine scenarios specified in Table 1 in random order and each subject made simultaneously all nine decisions. The computer randomly divided the participants into two groups, randomly paired one person in the first group with a player in the second group, and randomly implemented one of decisions made by the person in the first group.
Next, the computer randomly paired one person in the second group with a player from the first group and randomly implemented one of decisions made by the person in the second group. The computer then transmitted both decisions implemented to the players. After the participants recorded both decisions and their payoffs on their own personal record sheets, they proceeded to be paid privately by an assistant not involved with the experiment. At this time, the subjects also received a $5 participation fee.
Results
We begin by establishing that our results are consistent with earlier studies. Average data from the experimental sessions are reported in Table 2 . For each of the nine scenarios, the table shows the average amount passed, the recipient's average final payoffs, the number of dictators with positive amount given, and the number of selfish dictators. We define behavior in a scenario as selfish if the dictator reduces the recipient's payoff to the minimum amount possible. For example, a dictator is selfish in Scenarios 1, 2, and 4 if the amount given is $0 and is selfish in Scenarios 3 and 5 if the amount taken is $5. Out of 106 subjects, 26 are selfish in all nine scenarios, 18 are never selfish and 30 are selfish only once. On average, the payoff to the recipient decreases significantly as the experimenter transfers endowment from the recipient to the dictator. Table 3 shows the results from the three paired-difference tests. For example, column (1) shows that the recipient's payoff falls by an average of $3.30, from $9.44 in Scenario 2 to $6.14 in Scenario 1, and that this difference is significant. 
Finding 3: Extending the payoff possibilities by introducing or increasing the option to take reduces the payoff to the recipient.
Comparisons across Scenarios 2 and 3, Scenarios 4, 5, and 6, and Scenarios 7 and 8 measure the extent to which the addition of or increase in the taking option affects the recipient's final payoffs. Figure 1 illustrates how Scenario 3 extends the set of payoff possibilities to AC 9 All three median paired differences are also significantly different from $0 at the 1% level.
compared to the payoff possibilities AB in Scenario 2. Table 4 Table 4 compares the outcomes in Scenarios 2 and 3 and shows that payoff to the recipient decreases by an average of $1.88, from $9.44 in Scenario 2 to $7.56 in Scenario 3, and that this difference is significant. 10 All three median paired differences are also significantly different from $0 at 1% level.
To determine whether giving is equivalent to not taking, we compare the payoffs to the recipients in Scenario 1 to isomorphically equivalent Scenarios 3, 6, 8, and 9 and Scenario 2 to isomorphically equivalent Scenarios 5 and 7. Figure 1 illustrates the isomorphic equivalence of payoff possibilities in Scenario 1 to the payoff possibilities in Scenario 3, both represented by the AC segment. The minimum payoff for the recipient is $0 in Scenarios 1, 3, 6, 8, and 9. The amount the dictator must take to achieve this minimum increases from $0 to $20 in $5 increments across the five scenarios. The minimum payoff to the recipient is $5 in Scenarios 2, 5, and 7. The amount the dictator must take to achieve this minimum increases from $0 to $10 in $5 increments across the three scenarios. We include in all comparisons only the 80 dictators who were not selfish in at least one scenario. We exclude all those dictators who were consistently selfish and maximized their own payoff in all nine scenarios, because their behavior demonstrates that they value neither giving nor not taking. Table 5 contains the results of the six paired difference tests. Five paired differences show that the payoff to the recipient is significantly higher when the taking option exists; the mean paired difference for Scenarios 2 and 5 is positive but not significant. Column (1) in Table   5 , for instance, shows that the payoff to the recipient increases by an average of $1.27, from $5.37 in Scenario 1 to $6.64 in Scenario 3. A closer examination of the outcomes in Scenarios 1 and 9 illustrates the differences between giving and not taking. 11 In Scenario 1, the payoff to the recipient is the amount given because only the dictator has an endowment and taking is not an option. Scenario 9 is the reverse; the payoff to the recipient is the amount not taken because only the recipient has an endowment and the dictator can only take. Thus, a dictator who gives a positive amount in Scenario 1 could attain the same payoffs in Scenario 9 by not taking that same amount. However, the amount not taken in Scenario 9 is higher than the amount given in Scenario 1 for 49% of the dictators, while the amount not taken is lower for only 21% of the dictators. The propensity to be selfish increases slightly when not taking is the option. Otherwise, dictators tend to not take more than they give.
This result confirms that "an asymmetry between positive and negative externalities is generalizable to" (Andreoni, 1995, p. 13 ) dictator games. Andreoni compares the results of two versions of a public good experiment with isomorphic payoff possibilities -a positive frame in which contributions create positive externalities and a negative frame in which purchases of a private good create negative externalities. He finds that cooperation is significantly greater in the positive frame and concludes that, "there must be some asymmetry about the way people feel personally about doing good for others versus not doing bad: the warm glow must be stronger than the cold-prickle" (p. 13). Since not taking in a dictator game is not doing bad, Andreoni's results suggest that giving should be greater than not taking in isomorphically equivalent dictator games. We, however, find the opposite; giving tends to exceed not taking. That is, the cold prickle of taking from the recipient exceeds that warm glow of giving.
Concluding Comments
We test whether not taking in a dictator game is equivalent to giving. We conduct an experiment in which the dictator makes choices in nine different scenarios. We find that our 11 Grossman and Eckel (2012) study giving and taking from a charity in three cases -Self$20, Split$20, and Charity$20 -that correspond, respectively, to our Scenarios 1, 6 and 9. The average earnings for the recipient are $3.56, $9.73 and $3.60 in their cases and $4.05, $5.61 and $6.31 in our scenarios. They find that the earnings for the recipient increase when comparing Self$20 and Split$20, just as we do. Surprisingly, however, they find no difference in the final amount received by the charity in the two extreme cases of Self$20 and Charity$20. Also, the earnings in Split#20 are much higher than those in Scenario 6. They suggest " the initial even split acts, on average, as a strong focal point for our subjects" (p.13).
results are consistent with the results obtained in the standard dictator game, with Bolton and Katok's (2008) study of the effect of transferring endowment, and with List's (2007) and Bardsley's (2008) studies of the effect of adding the option to take. We compare the outcomes in games in which different levels of taking are allowed, holding the range of payoff possibilities constant, to examine whether not taking is equivalent to giving. We find that the two are not equivalent: the payoff to recipients tends to increase as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given payoff rises. Surprisingly our finding that the cold prickle of taking exceeds that warm glow of giving in dictator games is opposite to Andreoni's original finding in public good games.
We speculate that our results might apply in other settings. That individuals prefer not taking to giving might be an alternative explanation or a contributing motivation for observed differences in behavior previously attributed to framing effects or status quo bias. For example, organ donation rates are significantly lower in countries that require donors to opt in to donate instead of to opt out not to be a donor. Researchers usually attribute the difference to status quo bias and argue that policy makers in opt-in countries could increase donation rates by changing to an opt-out policy. Our results suggest another possible reason for the difference: donors prefer not taking to giving. Opting out could be viewed as taking; someone might lose the opportunity for a transplant if the decision maker opts out. Opting in could be viewed as giving: someone might obtain the opportunity for a transplant if the decision maker opts in. Other examples might include the decision to opt-out of contributing to a retirement or health insurance plan.
Finally, we note that our results also confirm List's conclusion that "the data suggest that current interpretations of dictator game data likely need revision." We show that not taking is not equivalent to giving. This means that the finding by Korenok et al. (2013) that impure altruism rationalizes choices in giving games does not apply to taking games. Our results suggest that adding the amount not taken as a fourth argument to the dictator's utility function might rationalize observed behavior. Of course, this addition would be a revision of current interpretations.
The experiment
In different scenarios you will decide what portion of your endowment to transfer to another participant in the room. We will refer to the person with whom you will be paired as OTHER.
You and OTHER will be paired randomly and will not be told each other's identity.
Each scenario specifies how much money is in your endowment, how much money is in the OTHER endowment and the range of allowable transfers. In some scenarios you can also transfer a negative amount: i.e., you can take some of the OTHER endowment. The transfer decision determines the earnings for both players.
Let's consider a Hypothetical Scenario in which your endowment is $3, the OTHER endowment is $2, and you may transfer any amount between -$2 and $3. The display on your computer screen would be:
OTHER endowment $2. Your endowment $3. You may transfer between -$2 and $3.
The transfer can be any number between -$2 and $3 in $0.1 increments. The computer program will reject transfer amounts like -$4, $0.33, or $5.
The table below shows the earnings for you and OTHER as the amount transferred increases from -$2 to $3 in $0.5 increments in the Hypothetical Scenario.
OTHER endowment $2. Your endowment $3. You may transfer any amount between -$2 and $3. Please spend a moment studying the table and raise your hand if you have any questions about how to calculate earnings.
Earnings
You will make a transfer decision for each scenario. After everyone makes the transfer decisions, the computer randomly chooses one of the decisions to implement.
The computer will randomly pick another person in the experiment to be OTHER and implement YOUR transfer decision. You will earn what is left of your endowment after the transfer, and the person with whom you are paired will earn his or her endowment plus your transfer.
You will also be OTHER in a second, different, random pairing. That is, the computer will implement someone else's transfer decision and you will earn your endowment plus the amount transferred. The person with whom you are paired will earn what is left of his or her endowment after the transfer.
Your total earnings are the sum of what you earn in the two pairings.
You will record your total earnings on the RECEIPT and take it to an assistant sitting outside the room for payment. To preserve your anonymity, the assistant does not know the nature of today's experiment. After the assistant pays you, you are free to leave.
Questions?
Please raise your hand if you have any questions about the instructions or if you wish to cease your participation. We will then proceed to the scenarios.
